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Snmmazy 
The START Treaty increases the role of the nordic area in the nuclear 
relationship between the US and the USSR. This is because the Treaty 
increases the relative importance of those strategic nuclear weapons which 
have nordic operational implications: 
1. The relative number of warheads on the US heavy bombers will 
increase to the point where this leg of the triad has the largest 
number of warheads in the strategic arsenal. Since this weapons 
system also has a strong potential nordic operational profile this 
could in turn increase the strategic importance of the nordic airspace. 
2. The Soviet SLBM force will be cut substantially, leaving only the 
most modern Delta IV and Typhoon SSBN classes and possibly a 
few Delta III. At present all Delta IV and Typhoon SSBN's operate 
from the Kola which is the only present basing area providing access 
to their Arctic patrol zones. The START cuts could thus leave 
virtually the full SSBN force based on the Kola, increasing the 
importance of the bases and the adjacent sea areas considerably. 
As a result the strategic importance of the nordic area will increase 
marginally, with a particular focus on the nordic airspace, as a potential 
launch and transit route for US heavy bombers, and on the nordic Arctic 
coastline and sea areas, as the primary or only basing and patrol area for 
Soviet SSBN's. 
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Intlroduction 
The START Agreement signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 will have 
consequences for the nordic area. On the political level the Treaty is a 
significant reflection of the current spirit of cooperation between the Soviet 
and US leadership. Since the tone of this relationship also is a key factor 
determining the European security-political climate this is fundamentally 
positive. However it is important to recall that the political situation in the 
Soviet Union is volatile. The Soviet leadership can change abruptly and 
with it the foreign and security policy which we have enjoyed under 
Gorbachev. Thus the present positive political climate is also unstable, 
since it depends largely upon how long Gorbachev remains in power 
and/or is able to continue his present foreign policy. However as long as 
it lasts it has a positive effect on the overall nordic security-political 
climate. 
On the military level the START Treaty will also have consequences for 
the nordic strategic environment. This is because part of the nuclear forces 
regulated by the Treaty have a partial nordic orientation. That is not to 
say that they are targeted against the nordic regions, but that their basing, 
transit or launch involves the use of areas close to or in the nordic area. 
This makes the affected regions of vital importance for US and Soviet 
national security, which in turn draws their political and military interest 
to these areas. Since the START Treaty alters the number and significance 
of these forces it will also affect their impact on the nordic region. This 
will not have immediate or direct consequences but will modify the Soviet 
and US strategic interests in the north, including the way in which they 
perceive the importance of the region and their nordic military posture. 
Hence the changes inaugurated by the START Treaty have long-term 
consequences for the regional security equation. These consequences are 
outlined below. 
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l. Before S'll'ART 
The US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces which are part of the START 
Agreement consist of a triad of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles 
(SNDV). They are: 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), 
Heavy Bombers (LRB • Long Range Bombers), 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). 
These strategic nuclear forces are part of the central nuclear relationship 
between the US and the USSR and as such represent weapons of last 
resort. Their primary function hitherto has been nuclear deterrence, and 
they have thus made a direct confrontation between the two great powers 
unthinkable. These weapons are thus not directed against the nordic region 
specifically, but the operation of these US and Soviet forces has involved 
the use of the nordic area or its vicinity to varying degrees. This is 
outlined below, giving the situation in the late 1980's. 
1.1. US Strategic Forces m tl:n.e North Before STAR.T 
The breakdown of the pre-START US strategic nuclear warhead arsenal' 
is provided in the table below and its nordic consequences analysed in the 
following subsections: 
System Warheads Percent 
SLBM 5,376 40.1% 
LRB 5,572 41.6% 
ICBM 2,450 18.3 o/o 
Tolals: 13,398 100.0% 
Two of the three weapons systems in the triad have involved planned or 
actual operations in or near the nordic region. They are the SLBM forces, 
whose nordic orientation has been gradually declining during the 1980's, 
Un1ess otherwise specified all percentages are based on the number of warheads of the different weapons 
systems in the US and Soviet sb'ategic nuclear arsenal in June 1990, using the START counting rules for the 
maximum pennitted real warhead loadings. The source for the data is: 
The MilitarY Balance 1990-1991. London, IISS, Oc!ober 1990: pp. 212-213, 216-223. 
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and the LRB forces, whose nordic orientation has increased during the 
1980's. US ICBM forces have no nordic operational profile whatsoever. 
US SLBM forces 
40% of the US arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads is deployed on 
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). 36% of these warheads 
consist of the Poseidon C-3 intermediate range SLBM. Its 4,600 km range 
means that it must be launched from patrol areas in the north Atlantic, 
Mediterranean or possibly northern Indian Ocean if it is to reach targets 
in the Soviet strategic heartland west of the Urals. Most of these SLBM 
are probably assigned patrol zones in the north Atlantic, which is where 
their main forward operating base lies (Holy Loch in Scotland) from 
which a reponed ten SSBN operate. 
On the other hand 64% of the US strategic submarine force is now 
equipped with the intercontinental range Trident C-4 and D-5 SLBM 
which is replacing the Poseidon. The 7,400 and 12,000 km range of these 
missiles permit them to reach strategic targets in the Soviet Union from 
most of the worlds oceans. Since the Soviet capability to track and attack 
US submarines increases the closer to the Soviet main naval bases one 
operates it is unlikely that the Trident submarines would approach the 
relatively dangerous waters around the nordic area. Thus the development 
of this SLBM system as of 1980 has actually reduced the strategic 
importance of the north since it is reducing the number and significance 
of those SLBM's deployed to the northern waters. 
US LRB forces 
42% of US strategic nuclear warheads are deployed aboard intercontinental 
range bombers (LRB). These bombers are all home-based in the United 
States and their shortest transit route to targets in the Soviet Union passes 
over the Arctic. For those bombers assigned targets in the Soviet heartland 
the shortest flight route passes over the 'European Arctic' - that is to say 
over Greenland, the northern pan of the Norwegian Sea and then directly 
over Norway, Sweden and Finland. This makes this nordic airspace of 
vital importance for the US offensive nuclear forces and for the Soviet 
strategic air defence efforts. 
How many US LRB actually would employ the shortest flight route to 
their targets is of course uncertain and would vary according to the 
scenario. These aircraft could approach their Soviet targets from a variety 
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of directions, using their aerial refuelling capability and/or operating via 
forward air facilities on Guam in the Pacific and Diego Garcia in the 
Indian Ocean. However most would probably use the direct Arctic flight 
routes. This is so for three reasons. In the first place it reduces the LRB 
dependence upon vulnerable support facilities. In the event of a nuclear 
war forward air bases would be destroyed in minutes and vulnerable 
airborne tanker operations could be interfered with or prevented. This 
makes the use of direct flight routes with a minimum of support 
dependence desirable or unavoidable. Secondly the desolation of the Arctic 
airspace means that there is less likelihood of the LRB 's being detected 
or interfered with by third parties, as could be the case if for instance the 
People's Republic of China, India, the Middle East or central Europe were 
used as transit routes. Finally the Arctic, and particularly nordic Arctic, 
offers the greatest security for the LRB forces. This is the only part of the 
world where they can approach the immediate vicinity of the Soviet 
frontiers behind the shield of an allied state (Norway) and with 
immediately available forward based air support (in the UK and Iceland). 
It is also the point where the Soviet strategic air defences are the thinnest 
since the bordering states of Norway, Finland and Sweden make it 
difficult for them to extend outwards beyond the Soviet frontiers, and the 
Soviet heartland begins immediately inside the frontiers. 
Thus an important part of the US LRB force would probably employ 
nordic airspace in the event of a war with the USSR. This possibility has 
increased since the deployment of the ALCM after 1982. This is a 
standoff weapon with a 2,400 km range, designed to be launched from 
relatively secure airspace beyond the reach of the Soviet air defences by 
the vulnerable B-52G/H bombers. One of the few areas in the world 
which both lies within 2,400 km range of the bulk of Soviet strategic 
targets and is relatively sheltered from the Soviet air defence system is the 
Norwegian Sea. Since the ALCM is also designed to be used en masse -
overwhelming the air defences - and in concert with the penetrating 
bombers - blasting a path for them through the defences - the ALCM has 
boosted the strategic importance of the nordic airspace considerably.' 
cf: RIES, Tomas: Strategic Implications of Unmanned Airborne Vehicles for the Nordic Region. Oslo, IFS, lsL 
ed, April I 990: pp. 39-44. 
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US ICBM forces 
18% of US strategic nuclear warheads are deployed aboard intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBM's). This force has virtually no nordic impact at 
all. It is entirely based in the US and its extra-atmospheric ballistic 
trajectory to its targets in the USSR passes far above nordic airspace. It 
has had a marginal impact on the nordic area by leading to the 
deployment of Soviet early warning EW radars to her Arctic coastline 
(Pechora and the Kola) and to the Baltic area but the security political 
consequences of these facilities are marginal. Thus this force has helped 
reduce the strategic imponance of the nordic area. 
1.2. Soviet Strategic lFoJrCes m the North before START 
The breakdown of the Soviet pre-START strategic nuclear warhead arsenal 
is provided in the table below and its nordic consequences analysed in the 
following subsections: 
System Warheads Percent 
SLBM 3,636 312% 
LAB 1,460 12.6% 
ICBM 6,545 562% 
Totals: 11,641 100.0% 
Two of the three Soviet strategic nuclear weapons systems have also 
involved planned or actual operations in the nordic area. They are the 
SLBM force, of which two-thirds has traditionally been based on the Kola 
and whose nordic orientation has increased strongly during the 1980's. The 
second force with a partial nordic orientation are the Soviet strategic 
bombers, whose estimated wartime use of the nordic area for forward 
basing and transit has remained roughly stable. Finally Soviet ICBM forces 
have no nordic operational profile whatsoever. 
Soviet SLJBM forces 
31% of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads are deployed on her SLBM's, 
which have a strong nordic orientation. In 1990 61% of all Soviet strategic 
submarines (38 SSBN) were based on the Kola and 39% on the 
Kamchatka Peninsula in the Far East (24 SSBN), which has also been the 
rough SSBN distribution for the last two decades. However since 1980 the 
imponance of the Kola bases has increased. During the 1980's the Arctic 
sea areas nonh of the Kola - the Barents, Kara and Greenland Seas and 
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the Arctic Ocean - became the patrol and launch zones for the modem 
Soviet SSBN's. This has led to the deployment of all Soviet SSBN classes 
constructed since 1980 - the Typhoon and Delta IV types - to the Kola. 
They are armed with the advanced SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 SLBM with 10 
and 4 warheads respectively. As a result 72% of the Soviet SLBM 
warheads are based on Kola and only 28% on Kamchatka: 
Nonhern SLBM/ WARHEADS 
SSBN Total Fleet SLBM SSBN Warheads NorFleet PacFieet 
DELTA IV 6 6 (100 %) SS-N-23 16 4 384 
TYPHOON 6 6 (100 %) SS-N-20 20 10 1,200 
DELTA Ill 14 7 (50%) SS-N-18 16 7 784 784 
YANKEE ll 1 1 (100 %) SS-N-17 12 1 12 
DELTA ll 4 4 (100 %) SS-N-8 16 1 64 
DELTA I 18 8 (44 %) SS-N-8 12 1 96 120 
YANKEE I 12 6 (50%) SS-N-6 16 1 96 96 
Totals: 61 38 (62 %) 2,636 (72%) 1,000 (28%) 
This makes the nordic area important both for the basing and operation of 
some three quarters of the Soviet SLBM warhead arsenal, leaving it a key 
element in the US-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship. This SSBN 
deployment is one of the primary factors behind the buildup of the Soviet 
Northern Fleet general purpose forces over the last three decades, as well 
having helped draw considerable US (and British) naval interest to the 
northern waters. 
Soviet LRB forces 
13% of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads are deployed on her 
intercontinental bomber force. These aircraft have their main peacetime 
bases deep in the central USSR and are not home-based near the nordic 
area. However all of these bombers are strongly dependent upon using 
the shortest transit route from the Soviet Union to their targets in the US, 
since they do not dispose of secure forward basing areas outside the 
USSR, and their aerial refuelling capability is limited. This means that 
most if not all would transit the Arctic in the event of war. In this respect 
it is important to note that 71% of the Soviet LRB main bases (five out 
of seven) are located west of the Urals. From here the shortest flight path 
to the US passes directly over or to the immediate north of the nordic 
states. While the Soviet LRB forces would disperse in the event of war 
and would probably not operate en masse, a significant proportion would 
in all likelihood transit the airspace in the immediate vicinity of the nordic 
states. This is also borne out by the fact that 40% (five out of twelve) of 
their forward staging bases along the Soviet Arctic coastline are located 
near the nordic area on the Kola (2) on Novaja Zemlya (1) and on 
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Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa (2). Thus the airspace around the nordic region is 
probably of major importance as a forward staging and transit route for 
the Soviet strategic bomber force. 
Soviet ICBM forces 
56% of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads are deployed on her ICBM 
forces. For the same reasons as for the US ICBM's these have had very 
limited nordic implications. Since the mid-1960's they have all been based 
in the central USSR relatively far from the nordic area, and their extra-
atmospheric ballistic trajectory places their transit route far above nordic 
airspace. Hence their deployment has reduced the strategic importance of 
the nordic area by diminishing the relative size and significance of those 
nuclear forces with a nordic orientation. 
1.3. CoDcll1liSlloJm 
On the basis of the above it is possible to establish a rough picture of the 
role of the nordic area in the US and Soviet strategic nuclear relationship. 
The table below provides an overview of the pre-START proportion of US 
and Soviet strategic nuclear forces based in the nordic area and/or 
estimated as having it as a primary operational zone in wartime:' 
Nordic% 
Warheads Nordic of total 
us SLBM 40% 30% 12% 
LAB 42% 90% 38% 
ICBM 18% 
Sum: 100% 50% 
USSR SLBM 31% 72% 22% 
LAB 13% 40% 5% 
ICBM 56% 
Sum: 100% 27% 
It is also possible to provide a slightly more precise picture of which parts 
of the nordic area are affected by the Soviet-US strategic nuclear 
Obviously this only provides a rough estimate of the strategic role of the nordic area in the US - Soviet 
strategic nuclear relationship. It is impossible to determine exactly how many strategic bombers would operate 
in a given area since this will fluctuate depending upon the scenario. However on the basis of available 
information it is possible to make a rough estimate of the general proportion of bombers which would have 
the nordic and adjacent airspace as a major operational area, and this is what the table provides. The 
percentages for the Soviet and US SLBM forces on the other hand are fairly reliable since these are actually 
based in the area. 
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relationship and - very roughly - to what extent: 
%of SNDV Airspace Sea Land %of Arsenal 
us 30% SLBM Patrol 12% 
90% LAB Transit/launch 38% 
0% ICBM 
USSR 72% SLBM Patrol Bases 22% 
40 o/o LAB Airspace FOB 5% 
0% ICBM 
It is interesting to note that roughly half of the US strategic forces have 
a potential nordic operational profile. This is largely due to the important 
role played by the US strategic bombers, which carry the largest number 
of warlteads in the US strategic nuclear arsenal and which have a strong 
nordic orientation. On the other hand the Soviet strategic nuclear forces 
have a relatively lower nordic profile, with one quarter likely to involve 
the nordic area in their operations. This is primarily due to the 
predominant role played by their ICBM force, which has no nordic 
orientation at all. 
8 
2. After START 
The exact consequences of the START Treaty for the composition of the 
US and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal are not possible to foresee since 
the Treaty leaves considerable latitude for each side to decide how it will 
make the cuts within the overall limits. However it is possible to draw 
some general conclusions and estimate the broad range of alternatives open 
to both sides. 
On this basis it appears likely that the proportion of US and Soviet 
strategic nuclear forces with a potential nordic orientation is likely to 
increase after START. This is so for three reasons: 
Firstly because the START reductions impose the strongest cuts on 
those forces with a non-nordic profile, that is to say US and Soviet 
ICBM forces. This means that the relative importance of the 
remaining forces increases. 
Secondly because the cuts imposed on the Soviet SLBM force will 
in all likelihood eliminate all Soviet strategic submarines based in 
the Far East, leaving all or almost all remaining SSBN's based on 
the Kola. 
Thirdly because the START counting rules (and US strategy) 
strongly favour the strengthening of the heavy bomber forces, which 
will increase the importance of nordic airspace further. 
One should note that the START Treaty imposes strong cuts on the US 
and Soviet ballistic warheads (ICBM and SLBM). The Treaty leaves no 
latitude in this area, obliging the US to cut ballistic warheads by a 
minimum of 38% and the USSR to cut them by at least 45%. This will 
reduce the ballistic warheads, but will also make the remaining ballistic 
warheads more important, since there are less reserves and the smaller 
forces will be more vulnerable. This increases the importance of whatever 
forces are left or moved up to the nordic area. This point is particularly 
important where the Soviet SSBN force is concerned. 
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Finally one should also note that the above warhead cuts (38% and 45%) 
only apply to both sides ballistic warheads, and that the counting rules for 
the bombers are far more flexible. This is dealt with below. 
Tables I. and 2. outline the present number of warheads in the US 
strategic arsenal included in the START Treaty, the warhead limits under 
the Treaty and the resulting cuts which the US must make if it is to 
comply with the Treaty. On the basis of the data presented in the table the 
US must - technically - cut her overall number of warheads by 38% and 
her Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDV) by 17% if she is to meet 
the Treaty limits: 
Warheads SNDV 
US total 
STAAT limit 
9.724' 
• 6.000 
3,724 (38 %) 
• Using START counting rules. 
1,930 
• 1,600 
330 (17%) 
The SNDV limits are precise and cannot be circumvented, but the warhead 
limits are extremely flexible and strongly favour the heavy bomber. In 
practice - as we shall see - the actual US warhead arsenal can be more 
than doubled by exploiting the special counting rules governing heavy 
bomber warheads. Secondly the Treaty permits considerable latitude as to 
the way in which the different SNDV types are reduced to meet the 
overall counting limits. The most likely options open to the US are 
examined below. 
US SLBM and ICBM forces 
One of the few certain predictions which can be made on the basis of the 
START regulations is that the US will have to cut her ballistic missile 
warheads (ICBM and SLBM) by at least 37%: 
US total 7,826 
STAAT limit - 4,900 
2,926 (37%) 
This is one of the few areas where the START Treaty leaves very little 
room for manoeuvre, as the limits and the counting rules are clear. 
However from here on the going gets less clear. Within the above overall 
ceiling governing the ballistic warheads the US is free to choose how the 
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ballistic cuts are to be made and hence what share of ICBM and SLBM 
will be eliminated. The size and composition of the remaining ICBM and 
SLBM force is therefore difficult to foresee. However one should note that 
the SLBM remains the only secure second strike system in the US nuclear 
arsenal, and as such it occupies a position of special importance. Thus it 
is likely that a significant number of warheads will remain deployed on 
the SLBM's. 
On the other hand it seems likely that the remaining SLBM force will 
only include the most modem Trident SLBM's and will lose its last 
intermediate range Poseidon forces. These ageing SLBM's (first deployed 
in 1971) have already been phasing out gradually in favour of the new 
Trident C-4.and D-5 systems and today only 12 Poseidon SSBN remain 
in operation. Their retirement is likely to be accelerated by the START 
Treaty partly because the total SLBM force must now be cut, and partly 
since each Poseidon SLBM is counted as carrying 10 warheads and hence 
substantial warhead savings (1,920) can be made by removing this SLBM 
type. This would cover 66% of the US ballistic missile warhead 
reductions: 
Minimum baJUstlc cut: 2,926 
Poseidon warheads: ~ 1,920 (66%) 
1,006 
Such a cut in the Poseidon force is important for the nordic region since 
it removes the last US SSBN type which had a clear north Atlantic 
orientation and of which part or all of the force could have involved the 
nordic waters. Their removal will help reduce the strategic significance of 
these waters, and in this respect reduce the nordic involvement in the US-
Soviet nuclear relationship. 
The reductions imposed on the remaining US ICBM and SLBM forces are 
difficult to predict. On the other hand the exact composition of the 
remaining ballistic missile force does not matter very much as far as the 
nordic area is concerned. Neither of these systems involves the nordic area 
in their operation. The ICBM force has no nordic orientation, while the 
Trident SLBM force is extremely likely to involve nordic waters. Thus 
what really matters is not their future mix but their relative importance in 
the overall US strategic nuclear arsenal. The greater this is the less 
important will be those systems which do have a nordic orientation, and 
hence the less involved will the nordic region be in the great power 
nuclear relationship. 
In this respect it is important to note that the relative importance of the 
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US ICBM and SLBM force will decline after START, as the proportion 
of warheads deployed aboard the ballistic systems will fall markedly. At 
a minimum level - assuming the full 4,900 ballistic missile force is 
retained - the drop will be from the present 58% of the total force down 
to 45%. As we shall see below it could be even greater, as there are 
reasons why the US ICBM/SLBM force may drop even lower than the 
4,900 warhead limit. 
Thus START is in fact imposing cuts on the two nuclear systems which 
have detracted from the strategic importance of the nordic area. This will 
make the remaining US SNDV system - the heavy bombers - relatively 
more important in the overall US nuclear arsenal. Since this system also 
has a marked nordic orientation this could also increase the strategic 
importance of the nordic area. 
US LRB forces 
On the surface the START Treaty indicates that the US will have to make 
significant cuts in her heavy bomber forces. Assuming that the US desires 
to retain her full complement of 4,900 ICBM and SLBM warheads then 
the heavy bomber warheads will have to be cut by 42%, since there are 
today 1,764 bomber warheads and the limit is 1,100. This will in theory 
reduce the US bomber force, but in practice the effect can be the opposite. 
The reasons for this are twofold: firstly because of the general drift of US 
national security strategy and specifically nuclear strategy, and secondly 
because of the special counting rules which apply to heavy bombers under 
START, and which strongly favour these systems. 
The evolving US National Security Strategy and nuclear strategy are 
presented elsewhere and will not be dealt with here: other than to note 
that it strongly favours the development of the heavy bomber forces over 
and above ballistic missile systems and that the essence of the US START 
strategy was based on favouring the bombers. Thus there is a strong trend 
suporting the strengthening of the US heavy bomber force, and particularly 
of the penetrating bombers. 
See for instance (and particularly TRlTTEN): 
1991 Joint Military Net Assessment. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C .• DOD, March 1991: pp. 12-7. 
RIES, Tomas: 'US National Security Strategy in the 1990's: in: Strategic Implications of Unmanned Airborne 
Vehicles for the Nordic Region. Oslo, IFS, !st. ed., April 1990: pp. 30-35. 
SNIDER, Don M.: Evolution of a New U.S. Military Strategy. Washington, D.C., CSIS, !st. ed., September 
1990: pp. 45. 
TRIITEN, James J.: America Promises to Come Back: A New National Security Strategy. (NPS-NS-91003A), 
Monterey, Ca., Naval Postgraduate School, !st. ed., May 1991: pp. 153, 
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This is evident if we look closer at the START counting rules which in 
fact permit both sides to increase the actual number of warheads 
dramatically over the 6,000 limit, if the warheads are placed on heavy 
bombers, and particularly if they are placed on non-ALCM heavy 
bombers. Thus having more bombers permits the US to have more 
warheads. This is so for two reasons: 
1. ALCM heavy bomber counting rules. 
The START Treaty distinguishes between ALCM bombers (which can 
carry ALCM) and non-ALCM bombers (which can carry bombs and 
SRAM). The US is permitted to have up to 150 ALCM heavy bombers 
which are counted as carrying 10 ALCM each though they actually are 
permitted to carry 20 ALCM: 
Actual ALCM: 150 x 20 = 3.000 
START count: 150 x 10 = 1,500 
Net gain: + 1,500 
Thus by deploying the full 150 ALCM bomber force the US can increase 
its authorised nuclear warhead arsenal from 6,000 to 7 ,500, which is a 
strong incentive to retain the full 150 ALCM bomber force. The US can 
also deploy more ALCM bombers, but in this case all those exceeding the 
150 level are counted for the actual number of ALCM which they carry. 
The US presently exceeds the number of limited-count ALCM bombers by 
22 aircraft: 
B-52G: 77 
B-52H: 95 
172 
START: 150 
Excess: 22 
Thus we can expect the US to reduce the present B-520 force to 55 
aircraft, which reduces the ALCM bomber force by 13%. From this 
perspective the size of this nordic-oriented weapons system will probably 
be cut marginally. One should also note that the 77 B-520 are only able 
to carry 12 ALCM. Thus if the ALCM bomber force is trimmed to fit the 
START ALCM counting limit and optimised for maximum ALCM loads 
(-22 B-520) then it would only carry 2,560 ALCM: 
8-52G 55 X 12 = 660 
B-52H 95 x 20 = 1.900 
2,560 
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Thus using the present B-520/H ALCM caniers the US will only gain 
1,060 warheads over the START limit of 6,000. (2,560 - 1,500 = 1,060.) 
However this can be increased to 1,500 when the B-520 are replaced with 
another ALCM bomber (eg the B-IB) in the years to come. This role 
conversion is already foreseen for the B-IB for when it is no longer 
perceived as capable of penetrating Soviet strategic air defences. USAF 
analysts estimate that this will be the case in the latter half of the 1990's. 
2. Non-ALCM heavy bomber counting rules. 
However the real warhead boost will probably come through the 
deployment of non-ALCM heavy bombers. Here the START Treaty 
permits truly remarkable warhead gains. All non-ALCM heavy bombers 
are counted as carrying only 1 warhead under the START rules, though 
they in fact are allowed to carry their full weapons load. The US B-520 
version which is not fitted for carrying the ALCM can carry up to 12 
bombs/SRAM and the B-IB can carry up to 24 bombs/SRAM. Thus the 
present US non-ALCM heavy bomber force is already permitted to carry 
2,614 warheads over the 6,000 warhead START limit: 
Bomber Number Warheads 
8-52G 39 X 12 = 468 
8-18 95 X 24 = 2.280 
Sum: 134 2.748 
By subtracting the START warhead count for these bombers from the real 
maximum load which they can carry we get the number of warheads over 
the START limit which these bombers provide the US: 
Actual warheads: 2,748 
START count: 134 
Difference: 2,614 
If we add up the existing extra ALCM and non-ALCM heavy bomber 
warheads which are permitted but not counted under START we thus get 
the actual authorised US warhead level: 
Extra ALCM warheads: 1 ,060 
Extra non·ALCM warheads: 2,614 
Sum extra warheads: 3,674 
Thus with the present heavy bomber ORBAT the actual number of 
warheads permitted to the US after START is 9,674 (6,000 + 3,674). This 
means that the US really only needs to cut her warhead arsenal by 28% 
to meet the START requirements, provided she retains her full heavy 
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bomber force along the lines indicated above: 
Real US warhead Iota!: 
Real START llmH: 
Cuts: 
13,398 
9,674 
- 3,724 (27.8 'Yo) 
However under these conditions 55 % of the US strategic warhead arsenal 
is carried by the heavy bombers: 
ALCM warheeds: 2,560 
Non-ALCM warheads: + 2,748 
Total bomber warheads: 5,308 
Real START limH: 
LAB warheads: 
Ballistic warheads: 
9,647 
- 5,308 (55 'Yo) 
4,339 
This represents an increase of heavy bomber share of the US strategic 
warhead arsenal of 13%, from the present 42% of warheads carried by the 
LRB up to 55%. This will make the LRB force the single strongest 
element in the nuclear triad. This is important if we take into account that 
this force has the nordic area as one of its primary operational zones, both 
for standoff ALCM launch and for transit of penetration bombers. 
Finally one should also note one important point. All the above 
calculations are based on the assumption that the US wishes to retain her 
full force of 4,900 warheads on the ballistic missiles (ICBM and SLBM) 
permitted under START. However this is by no means certain. It is quite 
possible that the US will reduce the number of her ballistic warheads 
below the 4,900 limit in order to deploy more bombers. 
There are two key arguments in favour of this option. Firstly it fits in 
with US strategy which is heavily in favour of an increase in the strategic 
bomber force, and particularly of dual-capable nuclear/conventional 
penetration bombers with a global range. This is favoured for several 
reasons'. On the nuclear strategic level because the manned penetration 
bomber provides the best means of delivering the type of discriminating 
strategic counterforce attack which appears to be a primary objective in 
US nuclear strategy in the 1990's. Secondly because the manned bomber 
can - unlike the ICBM and SLBM - also be used for conventional 
operations. Thus it is not limited exclusively to the frozen stalemate of 
nuclear deterrence but can be used to support US global interests and for 
regional contingencies. This is an argument which is equally attractive to 
cf. RIES, op. ciL, pp. 39-44. 
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Congress as it is to the Air Force, and in fact the move towards an 
increased emphasis upon dual capable heavy penetration bombers has been 
one of the key - if not the key - elements in the US START strategy. 
Secondly, an increase in heavy non-ALCM bombers would also permit an 
increase in warheads under the START counting rules. Thus replacing one 
Minuteman III ICBM attributed with 3 warheads for three non-ALCM 
bombers which are also attributed with 3 warheads but which are 
permitted to carry 72 warheads would increase the number of US 
warheads by a factor of 24: 
Number 
1 
3 
Weapons Warheads: Warheads: 
System START eount Reel count 
Minuteman IJI 3 3 
Non-ALCM bomberS 3 72 
In fact if the US so desired she could double her number of strategic 
warheads after START and still remain fully within the formal START 
warhead limits. An example of this is shown below: 
Warheads Total Total 
per SNDV: Warheads: Warheads: 
SNDV Number START count START count Real eount 
Trident 500 8 4.000 4,000 
MX 120 10 1,200 1.200 
B-18 800 1 800 19,200 
1,420 6,000 24,200 
Such a force would leave the number of delivery vehicles (SNDV) well 
within the START limit (1,600) and exactly match the START warhead 
limit (6,000) while providing the US with a real warhead total of 24,200. 
This is of course strictly hypothetical and will not happen for many 
reasons, but serves to illustrate the way in which the heavy bombers can 
be used to exploit the START counting rules. However the extreme 
development given above is neither necessary nor economically justifiable 
(given the cost of modern heavy bombers). Nor is it likely that the heavy 
bombers would be fully loaded with warheads in an operational context, 
since it limits their flight performance and because multiple bombing 
missions on such a scale overtaxes the flight crew. However what is likely 
is that the non-ALCM heavy bomber force may be prioritised over the 
other systems. Since these also have the nordic airspace as a primary 
transit zone in wartime such a development would increase the strategic 
importance of the nordic area. 
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Tables 3. and 4. outline the present number of warheads in the Soviet 
strategic arsenal and included in the START Treaty, the warhead limits 
under the Treaty and the resulting cuts which the Soviet Union must make 
if it is to comply with the Treaty. The USSR has a similar latitude in 
determining the exact form of the cuts within the overall START limits 
and thus the exact consequences cannot be foreseen. However as for the 
US it is possible to identify the likely general trend 
The USSR must techncially cut her overall number of warheads by 45% 
and her SNDV by 46% if she is to meet the Treaty limits: 
Warheads SNDV 
Soviet total 
START limit 
10.996' 
- 6.000 
4,996 (45%) 
• Using STAAT counllng rules. 
2,947 
- 1,600 
1,347 (46%) 
The launcher limits are clear but the the warhead limits are as flexible for 
the USSR as for the US, as is the latitude for determining how the cuts 
will be distributed within the overall limits. The likely options are outlined 
below. 
Soviet ballistic forces 
The START counting rules include specific limits on the two most modern 
Soviet ICBM types: the Heavy ICBM (SS-18) and the Mobile ICBM (SS-
24 and SS-25). Here the ceiling is set at I ,540 warheads for the heavy 
ICBM and 1,100 warheads for the mobile ICBM: 
Heavy ICBM warheads: 3,080 Mobile ICBM warheads: 825 
START timit: - 1,540 START llmH: 1.100 
1,540 (50%) + 275 (-h'l3%) 
These counting rules are clear. This means that heavy ICBM warheads 
must be cut by at least 50% but that the mobile ICBM can still be 
increased by 33% since the upper limit has not yet been reached. Thus the 
aggregate heavy and mobile ICBM cuts are actually 32%: 
Modem ICBM: 3,905 
START limH: • 2,640 
1,265 (32%) 
These ICBM are the most modern in the Soviet arsenal and a vital part 
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of her nuclear planning. Thus it is likely that their full quota will be 
retained. If this is so, and assuming the USSR wishes to keep her full 
4,900 ballistic warhead complement, there will be 2,260 warheads left to 
be split between the remaining older ICBM and the SLBM force: 
START ballistic limH: 4,000 
Hvy & Mob imH: - 2,640 
2,260 
Of course more warheads could be allocated by cutting the heavy and 
mobile ICBM warheads below the upper START limits, but this appears 
unlikely for the reasons given above. This means that major cuts will have 
to be made in the large arsenal of older ICBM and SLBM warheads: 
Older ICBM warheads: 2.640 
SLBM warheads: + 3,636 
Sum: 6,276 
These 6,276 warheads must be cut by 64% if they are to reach the 2,260 
warhead level: 
Old ICBMISLBM wrhds: 6,276 
AvaHable: • 2,260 
4,016 (64%) 
The distribution of these cuts betweeen the older ICBM and the SLBM 
forces is up to the USSR and thus difficult to foresee. However probably 
most cuts will be made in the older ICBM force. On the one hand the 
ICBM leg of the triad is already partly covered by the modem heavy and 
mobile ICBM warheads, and on the other hand since the Soviet SLBM 
force represents their only relatively secure strategic nuclear reserve. Since 
the Soviet SLBM force is of particular importance for the nordic region 
its development is examined in detail below. 
Soviet SLBM forces 
While the exact cuts to the Soviet SLBM force cannot be foreseen it 
appears that they under all circumstances will have to be cut considerably, 
even if they are prioritised over the older ICBM. On a minimum level -
assuming that the Soviet leadership scrapped all older ICBM systems in 
favour of the SLBM's - the SLBM force would still have to be cut by 
10%. Such an extreme development is unlikely. More probable is that at 
least some of the older ICBM are retained and that somewhere between 
40% to 60 % of the SLBM warheads are cut. The exact size of the 
SLBM reductions within these two extremes depends upon how many of 
the older ICBM' s the Soviet leadership chooses to preserve. 
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However from a nordic perspective a precise prediction is not necessary, 
since the strategic consequences for the nordic area are essentially the 
same at both ends of the scale. This is because even at the minimum end 
of the range, entailing 40% cuts, the USSR will have to eliminate virtually 
all of the older SSBN's. This in turn means that the only remaining SSBN 
forces will be based on the Kola, since this is where all of the modem 
SSBN forces are based today. This is illustrated in the table below, which 
shows how many SSBN's the USSR will have to cut if she is to reduce 
her SLBM warhead arsenal by 40 and 60 % respectively, and assuming 
that the Soviet Navy tries to retain as many modem SSBN as possible: 
40 % SLBM WARHEAD CUT 60 % SLBM WARHEAD CUT 
SSBN SSBN cuts Warhead curs SSBN cuta Warhead cuts 
Yankee I 12 (100 'Yo) 192 12 (100 %) 192 
tJeJiaT 18 (100 'Yo) 216 18 (100 'Yo) 216 
Delta II 4 (100 %) 64 4 (100 'Yo) 64 
VBiiK'ee II 1 (100 %) 12 1 (100 'Yo) 12 
1Jeffii1TI 8 (57%) 896 14 (100 %) 1.568 
lro1f 43 SSBN 1,380 (38%) 49 SSBN 2,052 (56%) 
These cuts can partly be offset by downloading - reducing the number 
of warheads on a missile. The START Treaty permits the downloading of 
up to a total of 1,250 re-entry vehicles on up to three different types of 
ballistic missile. This would pennit a greater number of SNDV (and hence 
SSBN launch platforms) to be retained if desired. However even if this 
option is used the Soviet SSBN fleet will have to be cut substantially. At 
a minimum this will probably involve the removal of 43 SSBN's - or 
roughly 70 % of the present SSBN force. If this is the case, and if the 
Soviets try to keep their most modem systems, then virtually all SSBN's 
with the exception of the Typhoon and Delta IV classes will have to be 
eliminated. This in tum pennits us to draw two main conclusions 
concerning the Northern Fleet. These are: 
1. On the basis of present deployments the bulk of the Soviet 
Navy's remaining SSBN's will probably be based with the 
Northern Fleet and operate in Arctic waters. All Typhoon and 
Delta IV SSBN's deployed so far operate with the Northern 
Fleet, whose Kola bases provide the only good access to the 
Arctic Ocean, for which the Typhoon and Delta IV classes are 
specially designed. As a result the role of the Northern Fleet 
in global nuclear strategy is likely to increase. 
2. An overall reduction of the number of strategic nuclear 
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launchers will make the remammg systems even more 
important. Because of the size of the likely SSBN cuts this 
applies particularly to this force. At the same time the 
remaining Soviet SSBN force would also - because it would 
be far smaller - become far more vulnerable to US strategic 
ASW. Hence we may expect US efforts to improve her 
strategic ASW capability - and Soviet efforts to defend her 
SSBN's - to increase as well and to be focussed to a 
considerable degree to the North Atlantic and Arctic. 
The aggregate result is that the importance of the Northern Fleet in global 
nuclear strategy will probably increase during the 1990's. This fleet will 
contain the lions share - if not all - of the Soviet SSBN forces, whose 
smaller number will constitute a primary strategic asset and target for the 
USSR and the US respectively. This will probably maintain - and possibly 
increase - both great powers strategic interests in the associated Arctic and 
North Atlantic waters. 
Soviet LRB forces 
Finally the same warhead counting rules apply to the Soviet heavy bomber 
warheads as for the US, which again makes the exact outcome of the 
START Treaty uncertain. However it is not certain that the USSR will 
seek to exploit the bomber option as fully as the US might. This is 
because the air breathing leg of the triad has not - yet - emerged as such 
an important element in Soviet strategic planning as it has in US planning. 
However this could change. 
Under any event the Soviet Union can still increase her heavy bomber 
warheads without breaking the START limits, since she has not yet 
matched them. If we assume that the USSR wishes to retain her full 
ballistic warhead quota of 4,900, then she will have 1,100 left for the 
heavy bombers. However the USSR presently only deploys 815 bomber 
warheads (according to the START counting rules) which means that this 
force can under all circumstances still be increased by 35% before it 
reaches the START bomber warhead limit. 
It seems likely that the USSR will seek to fill this gap, which cannot be 
filled by ballistic warheads, and thus there will probably be an increase 
in the Soviet LRB leg of the triad. As noted earlier this weapons system 
has a partial nordic orientation (estimated at some 40% of the full force) 
which in tum means that the strategic significance of the nordic airspace 
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may also grow along with the increase in the Soviet LRB force. 
It is also possible that the USSR will choose to boost her bomber forces 
above the 1,100 warhead limit, by cutting the number of ballistic warheads 
below the maximum level of 4,900. However this seems unlikely, given 
the Soviet penchant for ICBM and the already large cuts which she will 
have to inflict on her SSBN forces. One should also note that the US has 
a large technological advantage of the USSR in the manned bomber field, 
and hence it is not sure to what extent the USSR would want to focus on 
this area of comparative disadvantage. 
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The following general conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
consequences of the START Treaty for the nordic area: 
1. The relative number of warheads on the US heavy bomber leg 
of the strategic triad will increase and the heavy bombers will 
probably constitute the largest launch platform in the strategic 
arsenal. This increases the significance of this weapons system 
in the US-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship. Since this 
weapons system also has a strong potential nordic operational 
profile this could in turn increase the strategic importance of 
the nordic airspace. 
2. The Poseidon SLBM force will probably be eliminated, 
removing the last of the US SLBM systems with a clear north 
Atlantic patrOl profile. This will remove this link between the 
nordic waters and the US-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship. 
3. The remaining SLBM and ICBM force will be cut, reducing 
their relative importance in the strategic arsenal marginally. 
4. The Soviet SLBM force will be cut substantially, leaving only 
the modern Delta IV and Typhoon SSBN classes and possibly 
a few of the Delta Ill class. At present all Soviet Delta IV and 
Typhoon SSBN's are based on the Kola and they are likely to 
remain based there since this is the only area which presently 
provides access to their Arctic patrol zones. As a result all or 
virtually Soviet remaining SSBN's will be based here, 
increasing the relative importance of these bases and the 
adjacent sea areas. 
5. The overall Soviet ICBM force will be cut substantially, 
reducing its strategic importance in the Soviet arsenal 
marginal! y. 
The aggregate result is that the significance of the systems which have a 
nordic operational profile will increase after START. This will also 
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increase the strategic importance of the nordic area marginally, and 
particularly in two areas: 
The importance of the far northern waters as a Soviet SSBN basing 
and patrol zone will increase considerably. 
The importance of the nordic airspace for the US strategic forces 
will increase. 
The probably develoment is outlined in the table below: 
Pro.STAAT 
%of SNDV Airspace Sea Land % of Arsanal Trend 
us 30% SLBM Patrol 12 'Yo Decline 
90% LAB Transit/launch 38 o/o Increase 
0 'Yo ICBM Decline 
USSR 72% SLBM Patrol Bases 22% Increase 
40% LAB Airspace FOB 5% Increase 
0% ICBM Decline 
23 
6 
TAJBlLE ll.. US WAJRJBIEAD OVJERvliJEW6 
BALUSTIC 
ICBM 
SLBM 
Total: 
BOMBERS 
ALCM 
Non-ALCM 
Total: 
TOTALS 
START COUNTING RULES 
Warheads Umlt Dllference Percent 
2,450 
+ 5,376 
7,826 4,900 + 2,926 + 37 % 
1,764' 
+ 134 
1,898 1,1oo·· + 798 + 42% 
9,724 6,000 + 3, 724 + 38% 
Ba.aocl on 5T ART counting rubs: 150 X 10 • 1,500 
22 X 12 • 264 
- 1.764 
A:s\Jmn. US choosos to kHp tuD quota of ICBM and SLBM: 6.000 
·~oo 
1,100 
REAUTV 
Warhosds 
2,450 
+ 5,376 
7,826 
2,824 
+ 2,748 
5,572 
13,398 
However the US may choose to limit the Ballistic warheads further and favour the bombers. The bombers are in tact permitted 
to carry an extra number of warheads above the formal START limits. Thus having more bombers permits the US to have 
more warheads. There is no specific limit on bomber warheads. The US is permitted 150 ALCM bombers which are counted 
as carrying 10 ALCM each though they are actually permitted to carry 20 ALCM:"" 
Permitted ALCM load: 150 x 20 = 3,000 
START counting: 150 x 10 = 1,500 
Difference: + 1,500 
Thus the deployment of warheads on ALCM bombers is favoured under the START counting rules, since the US is permitted 
an extra 1,500 warheads over and above the 6,000 warhead limit From this perspective it is in the US interest to deploy the 
full number of ALCM launchers within the START counting rules. In addition all US non-ALCM carrying bombers are counted 
as carrying only 1 warhead though they are actually able to carry several SRAM or bombs. The present SAC non-ALCM 
bomber Ioree has the Jollowing load capability: 
39 8-52G X 
95 8-18 X 
12 warheads 
24 warheads 
Sum: 
Permitted warheads: 
START counting: 
Difference: 
= 468 
= 2,280 
2,748 
2,748 
134 
2,614 
Thus the deployment of warheads on non-ALCM bombers is strongly favoured under the START counting rules, since the 
US is permitted an extra 2,614 warheads over and above the 6,000 warhead ~mit. From this perspective it is in the US 
intsrest to deploy a large number of non-ALCM bombers. 
Not 1111 SAC AlCM bomboro C4ll carry 20 AlCM. Tho n B-52G can carry 12 AL..CM and lha 95 B-52H can carry 20 AlCM, for a total of 2,8.24 
AlCM. II thb fon:o kl. trlmmad to Ill the START AlCM counting llmlt5 and optlmbod for mazlmum ALCM loadD (- 22 B-52G • 150) thon k can prosenUy 
carry: 8-52G 55 x 12 • 680 
B-52H 95 x 20 • 1,900 
2.560 
Based on data from: 'Current Soviet strategic forces under START counting rules.' The Military Balance 
1990-1991. IISS, London, 1sL ed., October 1990: p. 212. 
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'll'AJBJLE 2. US JLA.UNClll!ER OWRVJIEW" 
Launchers START Difference Wrhda Tolal Sub- START Difference 
deployed lim II /lnchr Werhesds lola Ia II mil 
BALUSTIC 1,624 7,826 4,900 + 2,926 
ICBM 1,000 2,450 
Minuteman II 450 1 450 
Minuteman Ill 500 3 1,500 
MX 50 10 500 
SLBM 624 5,376 
Poseidon C-3 192 10 1,920 
Trident C-4 394 8 3,072 
Trident D-5 48 8 384 
Permitted 
BOMBERS: 306 1,854 1,100" + 754 
ALCM 172 11o·· + 62 1,720 150 w 2,560 1,100" + 620 
B-52G 77 10 770 55x12= 660 
B-52H 95 10 950 95x20= 1,900 
Non-ALCM 134 134 unl. 2,368 
B-52G 39 1 39 39x12=468 
B-18 95 1 95 95x20= 1,900 
TOTAL: 1,930 1,600 + 330 9,680 6,000 + 3,680 all whd 
- 2,926 bal wh 
754 bbr wh 
Auumes us rouln5 ful quota of bali:dlc miHID warhoarh. (6,000- 4,000. 1,100.) 
A=wmcs US l!mb no. or ALCM'o lo 1,100. (10 I 1,100 •110) 
Based on data from: 'Current Soviet strntegic forces under START counting rules.' The Military Balance 
1990-1991. IISS, London, 1st ed., October 1990: p. 212. 
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TABLE 3. 
BALUSTIC 
Heavy ICBM 
Mobile ICBM 
So biotal: 
Other ICBM 
SLBM 
SUblotal: 
Total: 
BOMBERS 
ALCM 
Non-ALCM 
Sublotal: 
TOTALS 
START COUNTING RULES 
Werltooda Umlt DIHerence 
3,080 1,540 + 1,540 
825 1,100 
-
275 
3,805 2,640 + 1,265 
2,640 
3,636 
6,276 2,260. + 4,016 
10,181 4,900 + 5,281 
720 
95 
815 1,1oo•• ~ 2as 
10,996 6,000 + 4,996 
Percent 
+50% 
-33% 
+ 32% 
+ 64% 
+52% 
-35% 
+45% 
REAUTY 
Warheadu 
3,080 
+ 825 
3,905 
2,640 
+ 3,636 
6,276 
10,181 
1,080 
380 
1,460 
11,641 
Assumes USSR chooses 1D kocp lui quota. of hoavy and mobllo ICBM'!!: 4,900 
2,640 
2,260 
Assumes USSR chooso3 to koop tuB quola of Banilltlc warhsads: 6,000 
·~00 
1,100 
However the Soviet Union may choose to limit the Ballistic warheads further and favour the bombers. This is because the 
bombers are in fact permitted to carry an extra number of warheads above the formal START limits. Thus having more 
bombers permits the Soviet Union to have more warheads. 
There is no specific limit on bomber warheads. The USSR is pennitted 180 bombers which can be loaded with up to 16 
ALCM but are counted as carrying only 8 ALCM each: 
Pennitted ALCM load: 180 x 16 = 2,880 
START counting: 180 x 8 = 1,440 
Difference: + 1,440 
Thus the deployment of warheads on bombers is favoured under the START counting rules, since the Soviet Union is 
permitted an extra 1,440 ALCM warheads over and above the 6,000 warhead limit. From this perspective it is in the Soviet 
interest lo deploy the full number of ALCM bombers within the START counting rules. II the USSR deploys more than 180 
ALCM bombers the additional bombers are attributed with their actual ALCM load. 
In addition all Soviet non-ALCM carrying bombers are counted as carrying only 1 warhead though they in practice can carry 
several SRAM andlor bombs. There is no limn lo the non-ALCM bombers. Thus the deployment of non-ALCM heavy bombers 
also pennits the USSR lo boost her warhead Ictal over and above the fixed START limit. 
Based on data from: •current Soviet strategic forces under START counting rules.' The Military Balance 
1990-1991. IISS, London, !st. ed., Oclober 1990: p. 213. 
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T.lWJLJE 4. SOVliE'lr JLAJ[JNCBER OVJERVl!EW" 
Launchers START Difference Wrhdo Total Sub- START Difference 
deployed II mil llnchr Werheods totals II mil 
BALUSTIC 2,322 10,181 4,900 + 5,281 
Heavy ICBM 308 154 + 154 3,080 1,054 + 1,054 
SS-18 308 154 10 3,080 
Mobile ICBM 285 825 1,100 
- 275 
SS-24 60 10 600 
SS-25 225 1 225 
Other ICBM 805 2,640 
SS-11 350 1 350 
SS-13 60 1 60 
SS-17 75 4 300 
SS-19 320 6 1,920 
SLBM 924 3,636 
SS-N-6 192 1 192 
SS-N-8 280 1 280 472 
SS-N-17 12 1 12 484 
SS-N-18 224 7 1,568 2,052 
SS-N-20 120 10 1,200 3,252 
SS-N-23 96 4 384 3,636 
BOMBERS: 185 815 1,1oo· 
- 285 
ALCM 90 137". - 47 720 1,1oo· -360 
Bear 75 B 600 
Blackjack 15 8 120 
Non-ALCM 95 
Bear 95 95 
TOTAL: 2,947 1,600 + 1,347 10,996 6,000 + 4,996 
• Assumes USSR retains full quota of ballistic missile warheads. (6,000- 4,900 = 1,100.) 
.. Assumes USSR limits no. at ALCM's to 1,100. (8/1,100 = 137.5.) 
Based an dsta from: 'Current Soviet sttategic farces under START counting rules.' The Military Balnnce 
1990-1991. nss, Landon, 1st ed., October 1990: p. 213. 
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TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFJENSNE ARMS 
From the U5-USSR Summit31/07-1991. 
LAUNCHER TOTALS: 
WARHEAD TOTALS: 
Maximum 1,600: 
- deployed ICBM's and associated launchers, 
- deployed SLBM's and associated launchers, 
- heavy bombers. 
Within this limit, maximum 154: 
• deployed heavy ICBM and associated launchers. 
Maximum 6,000 warheads attributed to: 
- deployed ICBM's, 
• deployed SLBM's, 
- heavy bombers. 
Within this limit, maximum 4,900 warheads on: 
• deployed ICBM's, 
- deployed SLBM's. 
Within this limit, maximum: 
- 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBM"s. 
- 1,100 warheads on mobile ICBM's. 
THROW-WEIGHT TOTALS: Maximum throw-weight ol deployed ICBM and SLBM to be cut to ca 50% below present level 
of Soviet throw·weight 
TIME· TABLE: Reductions will be canied out over a period of seven years in three phases. 
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HEAVY BOMBERS: 
COUNTING RULES: 
WARHEADS: 
LAUNCH VEHICLES: 
ALCM DEFINITION: 
Heavy bombers are divided between: 
- heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCM, 
- other heavy bombers. (sic) 
Heavy bombers with other nuclear armaments are counted as: 
- one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit, 
- one warhead against the 6,000 limit. 
Heavy bombers with lang-range nuclear ALCM are counted as: 
- one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit, 
- an agreed number of warheads against the 6,000 limit 
Existing and future long-range nuclear ALCM heavy bombers are attributed with: 
- 10 warheads for each US heavy bomber, 
- 8 warheads for each Soviet heavy bomber. 
Existing and furure long-range nuclear ALCM heavy bombers shall be equipped with no more 
than: 
- 20 long-range nuclear ALCM for US heavy bombers, 
- 16 long-range nuclear ALCM for Soviet heavy bombers, 
Within the 1,600 limit on delivery vehicles there shall be: 
- maximum 150 US heavy bombers with long range nuclear ALCM, 
- maximum 180 Soviet heavy bombers with long range nuclear ALCM. 
If the US or USSR exceed the above limits (150 & 180): 
-each additional heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCM will be attributed 
with the number of long-range nuclear ALCM for which it is actually equipped. 
Long-range ALCM wm be considered those with: 
- range In exceS8 of 600 km. 
There will be no restrictions on deployment of non-nuclear long-range ALCM on aircraft not 
limited by the Treaty. Future long-range ALCM will not be considered nuclear if they can be 
distinguished from long-range nuclear ALCM. 
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PRINCIPLES: 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
SLCM's will not be constrained by the START Treaty. 
Each side will provide the other with an unilateral declaration of its policy concerning nuclear SLCM's. 
Each side will provide the other with an annual unilateral declaration regarding its planned deployments 
of nuclear long-range SLCM's. These declarations will be politically binding. 
In the annual declarations the maximum number of deployed nuclear SLCM's will be specified, 
provided that the number declared will not exceed 880. 
Both sides agree not to produce or deploy nuclear SLCM with multiple independently targetable 
warheads. 
DEFINillON: A nuclear long·range SLCM has a range in excess of 600 km. 
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